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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a model of an electricity market and use it to explore the effect of
climate change on electricity prices and output. It has multiple generation fuels, uncertain
fuel availability, and storage options. The model is formulated in continuous time, which
mimics the many short trading periods common to electricity spot markets. It properly in-
corporates forward-looking generation decision making. It is calibrated to the New Zealand
Electricity Market and is used to estimate the effects of changes that may arise in characteris-
tics of fuels—water and gas—as a consequence of climate change and climate change policies.
It does so under the polar cases of a competitive market structure and monopoly. The results
illustrate the importance of allowing for volatility and including management of storage in
electricity market models. They suggest that reductions in average hydro fuel availability
will reduce welfare significantly, that increases in the volatility of hydro fuel availability will
also affect welfare, but to a very small extent, and that the value of reservoir expansion is
sensitive to the distribution of hydro fuel availability. The effects of a carbon tax are reported.
JEL Classification code: D4, D9, L1, L5, L9
Keywords: dynamic optimisation, electricity spot market performance, stochastic fuel avail-
ability, storage options, climate change
1 Introduction
A model that usefully assesses the effect of climate change on electricity market performance
should incorporate the salient features of electricity production and consumption that are suscep-
tible to climatic variation, and have explicit links to natural resource characteristics of relevance.
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A key climate-relevant feature is that the model should be dynamic. Our model incorporates
forward-looking intertemporal decision making that properly reflects fuel uncertainty and the
possibility of its management by storage. It explicitly incorporates intertemporal linkages that
are present in electricity generation even in the short run. Further, our model is tractable and
admits different market structures. These characteristics combine to render the model suitable
for exploring the implications for electricity market performance of potential climatic changes
and policy instruments. We calibrate the model to the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM)
in which hydro-generation supplies some 55–65 percent of generation capacity. The capacity of
the storage lakes is low and inflows to these lakes are volatile. We use this model to explore
the effects on electricity prices and production of variations in the stochastic properties of in-
flows that might occur under climate change, and of policy changes such as a carbon tax. In
particular, we explore the effect of variations in the mean and volatility of inflows.
Alternative, popular approaches to modeling electricity markets (termed strategic offering
and direct analysis) compare actual price and supply outcomes with those arising in a static
full information electricity market under perfect, and Cournot, competition. Strategic offering
analysis compares the actual offers of individual generators with estimates of the operational
marginal cost of turning fuel into electricity. Wolfram (1998) applies this approach to the UK
electricity market and Joskow and Kahn (2002) apply a similar approach to the California elec-
tricity market with respect to the summer of 2000. Wolak (2001, 2003) justifies the use of
revealed bid information to estimate Lerner indices in a static model that does not recognise
uncertainty. In a variation, direct analysis constructs static supply curves for the entire mar-
ket. It was applied by Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002)
in studying the California market.1 These approaches have not used forward-looking supply
curves that reflect resource availability uncertainties and storage: rather they treat suppliers as
myopically reacting to marginal cost that is public information. These uncertainties are intrinsic
to de-regulated electricity markets, and Evans and Guthrie (2009) show that uncertainty about
resource factors may materially affect generator behavior and consequently market outcomes
and the interpretation of electricity market data. Twomey et al. (2005, p. 23) acknowledge
opportunity cost measurement issues in estimating marginal cost but do not suggest a solution.2
While this literature focusses on assessing market power in electricity markets, that is not the
subject of our investigation. However, we do explore the polar cases of the central planner and
monopoly to assess where market structure is important for the effects of climate change.
Dynamic decision making in electricity markets has been considered in other literatures.
Operational research models have been constructed to simulate electricity systems and incor-
porate generator behavior; they are typically in discrete time, complex and not comprehensibly
tractable. The discrete-time model of Scott and Read (1996) falls in this literature. Differ-
ences from our model include that it does not have period-by-period generator decision making
under uncertainty driven by a time dependent stochastic inflows. Other literature implements
a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium approach to the operation of electricity markets (for example,
Hortescu and Pullar (2008)).3 This approach is used in “hybrid” models that employ elec-
tricity market equilibrium models to explain prices in terms of observable quantities, assume
dynamic behavior of state variables, and apply no-arbitrage conditions to calculate derivative
prices.4 While this approach is forward looking it does not lend itself to calibration to natural re-
source characteristics—such as uncertain sequences of fuel availabilities and its management by
storage—that will be informative about the effect of changes on electricity market performance;
1Green and Newbery 1992; Wolfram 1999; Bushnell 2005; Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia 2004 also employ
direct analysis in their modeling.
2Mu¨sgens (2006) also uses the standard approach and does not mention fuel availability.
3See also Espinosa and Riascos (2010).
4See, for example, Skantze et al. (2000) and Lyle and Elliott (2009).
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or permit study of the mix of generators with different fuels.
Prospective climate change remains highly uncertain and controversial. For our purpose
we need not distinguish between climatic cycles in a stationary environment (Bro¨nniman et al.
(2008)) and irreversible climate change. Present concerns by many about climate change largely
arise from attribution to greenhouse gas emissions of the past triennium (Stern, 2006). At the
same time there is increasing demand for high quality electricity,5 augmented by the evolving
penetration of digital products in modern economies. While there are many possibilities for
the evolution of alternative sources of electricity that consume fewer non-renewable natural
resources than at present, these technologies are unlikely to have a material impact in the
medium term. Economically efficient production and transmission of electricity using existing
technologies remains important, where economic efficiency incorporates all facets of competing
resource use. Electricity interacts strongly with the natural environment in fuel, production,
and transmission.
We use our electricity market model to explore the effect of potential climate change, affecting
natural resource characteristics, on electricity price and quantity, the composition of fuels used
to generate electricity, and the role of storage, under different market structures. The particular
scenarios we consider are changes in the average flows of water to hydro reservoirs and their
predictability and volatility. We also consider the implications of different sized reservoirs and
the availability and cost of gas. The latter will include the possibility of a carbon tax. We will
present values of stored water as part of our findings. Possibilities for New Zealand climate
change are suggested by the Ministry for the Environment.6 It suggests increased volatility of
weather,7 which seems to be a widespread prognostication (see Katz and Brown (1992)). It is
one we address directly.
We find that if climate change reduces the long-run level of inflows to hydro storage lakes
then it will reduce welfare significantly. If it increases the volatility of these inflows, or decreases
their rate of mean reversion, then it will produce more volatile outcomes, but the effect on
welfare will be small. Monopoly reduces welfare measured ex post in each trading period, uses
a different mix of generation, and significantly reduces price volatility for the same quantum
of storage capacity. A carbon tax has predictable effects in that it induces the substitution of
hydro for gas generation, and increases the volatility of prices and total surplus. The carbon tax
reduces the total surplus of the electricity market. The value of a larger reservoir is sensitive to
the different climate change scenarios. We show that an expansion in the reservoir would be of
benefit where inflows become more volatile, but of negligible benefit when average inflows fall.
In general there may be a conflict between consumers and generators because in some settings
reservoir expansion induces conflict between consumer and producer surplus, even when it raises
total surplus.
In Section 2 we set out the model, calibrate it to the NZEM, and assess the market outcomes
it produces under alternative market structures. In Section 3 we modify stochastic resource
availability in ways that potentially may occur as a result of climate change and assess how
these affect market performance. We draw conclusions in Section 4.
5That is, electricity with specific characteristics and continuous availability.
6The New Zealand Ministry for the Environment at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/resources/impact-
map/index.html (accessed 15 April 2010).
7See Ministry for the Environment at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/climate-change-effect-
impacts-assessments-may08/html/page5.html (accessed 15 April 2010).
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2 An electricity market model
2.1 The model
The model we specify has gas and hydro generators that sell into an electricity spot market, and
consumers that purchase directly from that market. Although it treats both generators as being
held by one owner, decisions are taken such that market outcomes are those a central planner
would choose in seeking a social welfare maximum. It will mimic outcomes of a competitive
electricity market in which each generator holds a gas and hydro generator.8 We contrast these
outcomes with those of monopoly ownership of all generators.
The model will be calibrated to the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM). It has a general
form that may be calibrated to other markets. In this specification it presumes a network with
three nodes: one each for the gas and hydro generators and one for consumers. The auction and
dispatch process for NZEM produces prices and quantities for each half hour. Our model is cast
in continuous time, enabling it to closely mimic the real time nature of electricity markets.9
The hydro generator’s fuel supply is limited by the availability of stored water and river
flows (inflows to the hydro lakes). The inflow at time t, measured in terawatt hours per year
(TWh/y), is denoted yt and evolves according to the diffusion process10
dyt = η(µ− yt)dt+ σ√ytdξt,
where dξt is independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance dt. It follows
that, conditional on yt, the rate of inflow at date t + dt has expected value yt + η(µ − yt)dt
and standard deviation σ
√
ytdt. Inflows are non-negative in this process and the unconditional
(time independent) mean and standard deviation of inflows in TWh/y equal µ and σ
√
µ/2η
respectively. The parameter η determines the speed with which departures of inflows from the
unconditional mean drift back to the mean. As η approaches zero the inflow process approaches
a random walk without drift, rendering historical inflows no assistance in inflow prediction. In
contrast, as η approaches infinity the inflow process becomes well approximated by a constant
long-run level plus a stationary disturbance term, and thus much more predictable.
We assume that the lake has the capacity to hold water capable of producing s¯ TWh of
electricity. At date t, the storage lake contains water capable of producing st TWh of electricity
and hydro generators are producing electricity at a rate of zt TWh/y. Hydro generation is
subject to the constraint of plant capacity, z¯, so that hydro electricity production satisfies
0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯. It is also subject to the availability of water. Whenever the lake has some spare
capacity, the lake level evolves according to dst = (yt − zt)dt. If the lake is empty then output
is constrained by zt ≤ yt, so that dst ≥ 0. If the lake is full then the lake level evolves according
to dst = min{0, yt − zt}dt; that is, electricity is generated at rate zt and any inflow in excess of
this amount is not used in storage or hydro generation but rather is spilled from the reservoir.
Gas generators are assumed to have increasing marginal cost. If gas generators are producing
electricity at a rate of mt TWh/y at date t then the total cost of generation is c(mt) = bm2t .
Increasing marginal cost reflects the distribution of efficient thermal plant. Older, or more fuel
8We assume an equivalence between the social planner’s decisions and perfect competition (Scheinkman and
Schechtman, 1983).
9A key feature of electricity markets is that, because storage of electricity (in contrast to fuel) is not cost
effective, dispatch of generation is managed to meet demand at each instant of time (Stoft, 2002, ch. 1). Prices
are determined almost in real time—NZEM has 5 minute pricing (Evans and Meade, 2005), a time weighted
average of which produces a price for the period. The 5-minute prices are indicator prices for market participants;
the transaction prices are calculated after the trading period is closed. Thus, continuous time models provide a
good approximation to the operation of these markets. Our model does not address other features of electricity
markets, such as seasonality, except insofar as these are reflected in the timing and amounts of inflows.
10This stochastic process is used by Cox et al. (1985) to model stationary, non-negative interest rates.
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flexible, plant that are less efficient in converting gas to electricity will have higher marginal costs
than will modern plants. A constant term could be included in the cost function to represent
the role of must run, or base load, generation, but it would not affect generation decisions.
Electricity generated by gas satisfies the constraint 0 ≤ mt ≤ m¯, where m¯ is the maximum
capacity of the thermal generation plant.
The hydro and gas generators are physically separated from consumers, so that some elec-
tricity is lost during the transmission process. Of each unit of electricity generated by the hydro
plant, only k1 units are available to consumers; the residual is lost in transmission. Similarly,
of each unit of electricity generated by the gas plant, only k2 units are available to consumers.
We assume that hydro generators are located at a transmission network node further from con-
sumers than are the gas generators, so that hydro generation experiences greater transmission
losses than gas generation: k1 < k2 < 1.11
Consumers reside at the third node of the network. Their demand is captured by the inverse
demand function pt = ϕ(k1zt + k2mt) where ϕ′ < 0 and the price is measured in dollars per
megawatt hour ($/MWh) or, equivalently, millions of dollars per TWh.
2.2 Solving the electricity market model
The social planner’s objective is to maximize the expected present value of the total surplus
produced by the electricity market, which looking forward from t = 0 is
W (s0, y0) = E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtTS(z(st, yt),m(st, yt) : yt)dt
]
,
where
TS(zt,mt : yt) =
∫ k1zt+k2mt
0
ϕ(q)dq − c(mt)
and r is the real discount rate.12 The social planner’s objective function has generation expressed
in terms of the state of the market (that is, storage and inflows) and thus implies optimal
generation policies that depend on storage and inflows. Total surplus does not include costs
associated with hydro generation. It assumes that the variable cost of the hydro generation
is zero, and that reservoirs and their costs are fixed over time. The presence of the storage
option provided by reservoirs will affect the present value of expected surplus by enabling hydro
generation to be shifted between time periods. Depending on inflows and generation capacity it
will also provide more useable water for generation in aggregate.
The maximum of the social planner’s forward-looking intertemporal objective function must
satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 = max
zt,mt
(yt − zt)∂W
∂s
+ ν
∂W
∂y
+
1
2
φ
∂2W
∂y2
− rW + TS(zt,mt : yt) (1)
subject to the generation constraints 0 ≤ zt ≤ z¯, 0 ≤ mt ≤ m¯ and, if and only if st = 0, zt ≤ yt.
Neglecting the elements of (1) that are not functions of (zt,mt), the level of generation will be
such that
TS(zt,mt : yt)− zt∂W
∂s
=
∫ k1zt+k2mt
0
ϕ(q)dq − c(mt)− htzt
11Gas-fired generators typically have an option that hydro-generators lack; the option to transmit fuel (gas)
and generate in the vicinity of consumers.
12We assume that expectations are based on risk-neutral probabilities and hence that r is the risk-free interest
rate (see Lengwiler (2004, pp. 44–45)).
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is a maximum, where ht ≡ ∂W∂s |(st,yt) is the impact on the expected present value of future welfare
resulting from an increment in stored water and thus is the shadow price of stored water. The
first-order conditions for an interior solution are
ϕ(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) =
ht
k1
, (2)
ϕ(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) =
c′(m∗t )
k2
. (3)
For each of optimal hydro and gas generation the consumer price equals marginal cost (inclusive
of transmission losses). In the case of hydro generation, marginal cost includes the opportunity
cost of using stored water at time t rather than leaving it in storage and using it for generation at
some later date. The solution to the social planner’s problem must satisfy (1)–(3) simultaneously.
However, it can be partitioned into a static and a dynamic problem with the link provided by
the shadow price of water, ht. The shadow price can be taken as exogenous when choosing
generation levels at time t (via (2) and (3)), but W , and hence ht, must satisfy (1) and the
dynamic constraints
dst =
{
(yt − zt)dt, if st < s¯,
min{0, yt − zt}dt, if st = s¯. (4)
It influences generation at t by means of (2) and (3). We use this partition to solve the model.
First an exhaustive set of feasible generation policies are obtained by solving (2) and (3)
subject to the generation constraints for a grid of possible feasible values for yt and ht.13 This
first stage yields a set of generation policies {zˆ(yt, ht), mˆ(yt, ht)} that satisfy (2) and (3) and the
generation constraints.
In the second stage the generation policy {z(yt, st),m(yt, st)} satisfying (1)–(3) and the
dynamic constraints is obtained by an iterative process. It uses a grid defined in (y, s) space
where s ∈ (0 = s1 < s2 < . . . < sJ = s¯) increases by increment ds and y ∈ (ymin = y1 < y2 <
. . . < yK = ymax) increases by dy. The resulting grid has JK pairs of levels of inflows and stored
water. The iterative process is then as follows. Starting with n = 1:
1. A guess is made of the generation policy at each point (y, s) as {z(n−1)(y, s),m(n−1)(y, s)}.14
2. Then, W (n) is defined by evaluating (1) at these generation levels thus:
0 = (y − z(n−1))∂W
(n)
∂s
+ ν
∂W (n)
∂y
+
1
2
φ
∂2W (n)
∂y2
− rW (n) + TS(z(n−1),m(n−1) : y).
3. Taking as the shadow price of water h(n) = ∂W
(n)
∂s , optimal generation produced at each
point (y, s) is given by
z(n)(y, s) = zˆ(y, h(n)(y, s)) and m(n)(y, s) = mˆ(y, h(n)(y, s)).
4. The second and third steps are repeated until each of |m(n) − m(n−1)|, |z(n) − z(n−1)|,
|h(n)−h(n−1)|, and |ϕ(k1z(n)+k2m(n))−ϕ(k1z(n−1)+k2m(n−1))| is smaller than an arbitrary
threshold, which we set to 10−6.
These policies mean that the optimal choice of generation and storage are available for each
(y, s) position on the space defined by the grid.
13In this description we use interior solutions. In fact, solving (1)–(3) requires meeting the generation and
dynamic constraints. The solution process is altered when these constraints are binding.
14The initial guess is a level of generation within the generation and dynamic constraints.
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Figure 1: Optimal storage policy and the shadow price of water
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This process yields the social planner’s optimal generation policies (that is, (zt,mt)) for each
point on the (y, s) grid.15 The left-hand graph in Figure 1 illustrates the optimal storage policy
for the calibration that will be described in Section 2.3: each curve plots the rate of change in
the lake level, given in equation (4), as a function of the current rate of inflow (yt) for a different
lake level (st). The lake fills most quickly when inflows are high and the lake is almost empty;
it empties most quickly when inflows are low and the lake is almost full. The right-hand graph
plots the shadow price of water, ht = h(st, yt), as a function of inflows for the same three lake
levels.
The shadow price of stored water embodies the intertemporal concerns that affect opti-
mal storage policy. It reflects all the characteristics of the electricity market contained in the
model and it jointly determines contemporary generation via the first-order conditions (2) and
(3). Because it is the expected value of the last unit of stored water looking forward over the
foreseeable future, it is affected by the characteristics of the inflow process—its average level,
volatility and predictability—as well as the particular structure of the model and generation
decisions based upon this particular structure. In particular, given the inflow characteristics,
this expectation will be affected by participants’ objective functions, period-by-period volatility
in electricity outcomes, and measures of welfare. Thus, the levels of ht resulting from changes in
the electricity market operating environment—for example, inflow characteristics and reservoir
size—are complex to predict. As a result, the effect of such changes on generation decisions are
also complex to assess.
The shadow price of stored water is jointly determined by the exogenous specification and
operating environment of the market, and thus, potentially, by all characteristics of the model.
Furthermore, it is endogenously determined with generation levels. It renders assessment of
exogenous changes to the market environment complex to assess, which is in sharp contrast to
static models of electricity markets, and those models that do not embody sequential forward
looking decisions based upon information arrival over time. Particularly for static models the
first order conditions may yield predictions of the effects of change within the context of those
models; but at the cost of not taking account of intertemporal linkages that are important in
electricity markets.
In the case of monopoly exactly the same four steps are applied but using the monopolist’s
15The iterative solution is obtained for all points on the grid and the solutions for intermediate combinations
of (y, s) are obtained by interpolation.
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first-order conditions
ϕ(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) + (k1z
∗
t + k2m
∗
t )ϕ
′(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) =
ht
k1
ϕ(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) + (k1z
∗
t + k2m
∗
t )ϕ
′(k1z∗t + k2m
∗
t ) =
c′(m∗t )
k2
instead of (2) and (3).
2.3 Calibration
The New Zealand spot market, in common with many other electricity markets, operates with
dispatch determined by a uniform price auction. The auction results in a single price at each
market node of the network.16 We calibrate the model to the New Zealand electricity market.17
Monthly data on New Zealand aggregate water inflows for the period July 1931–June 2008 imply
the following stochastic process for yt:
dyt = 6.92(24.7− yt)dt+ 4.49√ytdξt (5)
which has unconditional mean and standard deviation of 24.7 TWh/y and 6.0 TWh/y, respec-
tively.18
We assume that all non-hydro generation is gas generation19 and calibrate the hydro and gas
plant capacities as follows. In December 2007 the installed capacity of NZEM was 9396 MW, of
which 5349 MW was hydro. If all generators ran at full capacity continuously for a year, hydro
generation would be 47 TWh and non-hydro generation 35 TWh. These are used as the annual
capacities of hydro and gas plants, respectively. We take the capacity of the lake to be that
reported for storage capacity in June 2006, 4.44 TWh.
The subsequent analysis suggests that the price to consumers will be at least the marginal cost
of supply. Taking the average daily price of electricity at the Haywards node in the 2007 calendar
year ($52.41/MWh) as the marginal cost of gas at its associated market clearing quantity of 18
TWh, we calibrate b in the gas marginal cost function c′(m) = 2bm to be b = 1.46.
The transmission cost parameters are estimated by price ratios between nodes taken to
represent the generators and consumers.20 Because the bulk of hydro generation is in the South
Island the node taken for this generation plant is the southern, Benmore, node. Given that
the largest consumer market is towards the north of the North Island, Otahuhu is assumed
16This is a characteristic of the institutional electricity markets of the CAISO, PJM, ERCOT and NYISO (see
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp, accessed 11 May 2010), and the Australian electric-
ity market (NEM) (see http://epress.anu.edu.au/cs/mobile devices/ch11s03.html, accessed 11 May 2010). The
NZEM is described at http://www.electricity.commission.govt.nz (accessed 15 April 2010).
17All inflow, demand, and spot-price data were obtained from the New Zealand Electricity Commission’s Cen-
tralised Dataset (http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz/opdev/modelling/centraliseddata). Generation ca-
pacity figures are from the Ministry of Economic Development (2009).
18When we simulate daily data on inflows, we will use yt+dt = 0.4683 + 0.9810yt + 0.23502
√
ytN(0, 1). The
effect of this will be that in NZEM the shadow price of water—and hence generation decisions—at any date t will
reflect expectations of future inflows that are informed by the history of inflows.
19The quantum of generation that is not fossil-fuel fired or hydro was 13.5% in 2008 (Electricity Commission,
2009, p. 6). It largely consists of plants such as geothermal and wind that are must-run in nature. To some extent
these are captured in the model by increasing marginal cost and the relatively low transmission cost of gas which
means that some “gas” plants always run in the model. Coal produced 10.5% of generation in 2008, and this too
can be assumed to be treated in the gas component of the model.
20Evans, Guthrie and Videbeck (2007) estimate that the New Zealand market was, for the period of the study
1996–2006, and particularly 1999–2006, integrated into one market. Thus the differences between at least the
central nodes of the network represented predictable transmission losses that were not dominated by regional
network separations brought about by regional constraints.
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Figure 2: Thirty years of daily inflows (yt)
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to be the consumer node, and the Haywards node lying between the two previously described
nodes is taken as that for gas generation. Using daily average prices for the 2007 calendar
year, we find that the average Benmore–Otahuhu relative price is k1 = 0.956 and the average
Haywards–Otahuhu relative price is k2 = 0.984.
The consumer demand function is assumed to be linear with an elasticity of −0.4 at the aver-
age electricity consumption and price for the 2007 calendar year.21 This elasticity was assumed
by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) in their study of the California electricity market. They used
a constant elasticity, but linear demand enables the elasticity to vary with price–quantity pairs
which seems a reasonable assumption where these vary significantly. The average price at the
Otahuhu node was $52.76/MWh and nationwide demand was 38 TWh. In combination with
the elasticity, this yields the inverse demand curve ϕ(q) = 185− 3.47q.
2.4 Synopsis of market outcomes
In this section we use the generation policies constructed above to simulate a daily time series
of the state of our calibrated model of the NZEM for a 30-year period. This long period
ensures that the model is subject to a wide range of inflow scenarios, and that the outcomes are
negligibly affected by the starting values of s and y. Figure 2 depicts the series of simulated daily
inflows, which is constructed using the stochastic process in equation (5). It contains 10,590
daily inflow observations, with an unconditional mean of 24.54 TWh/y and standard deviation
of 6.13 TWh/y. While most of the inflows lie between 15 and 35 TWh/y, there are some periods
with very low, and others with very high, inflows. The lowest inflow of 10TWh/y occurred in
the 22nd year, whereas a very high inflow of 59TWh/y occurred in the 23rd year.
Market outcomes include the model’s outputs of daily hydro and gas generation, together
with the ancillary quantities of storage and spot price. Figure 3 shows the level of stored water
during the 30-year period when generation follows the social planner’s optimal policies. The
average storage level is 1.42 TWh, 32 percent of maximum storage capacity.
The social planner uses and stores lake water continually in applying its generation policy,
which is reflected in its higher volatility of inflows (6.13 TWh/y) than the rate of change in the
lake level (standard deviation of 4.05 TWh/y) and in the correlation of 0.85 between inflows
and the rate of change in the lake level. The lake is generally partially full. However after
21The year 2007 was chosen as it was not a year of extreme inflows.
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Figure 3: Level of storage (st) under competition
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periods of sustained low (high) inflows the lake becomes empty (full) and this occurs several
times during the 30-year period. The time taken to draw down all the water in the lake depends
upon the initial level of storage. For example, at the start of the second year, storage has been
low (approximately 0.4TWh). The associated low inflows mean that it is socially worthwhile
generating from stored water, even to the extent of emptying the lake. In the periods when the
lake is full, relatively high inflows pose the likelihood of spilling, in which case the shadow price
of stored water will be zero.
The shadow price of water is shown in Figure 4. It is particularly interesting since it is
unobserved in electricity markets and must be indirectly estimated. As (2) and (3) indicate,
the shadow price of stored water will be determined by the marginal cost of gas, adjusted for
transmission costs where there is an interior solution.22 The shadow price of water has an
average value of $46.06/MWh over the period with a standard deviation of $4.61/MWh. It is
strongly negatively correlated with inflows (correlation coefficient −0.78) and the level of storage
(correlation coefficient −0.83). These correlations are to be expected, given that ht is the price
of stored water, which will be low when current and/or anticipated future lake levels are high.
When the lake is full there is no opportunity cost of using inflow for generation, as is shown by
comparison of Figures 2 and 3: the shadow price falls significantly when the lake is full. The
drop is particularly sharp in the 23rd year when inflow exceeded hydro generation capacity and
excess water had to be spilled resulting in a very low shadow price of water.
The level of hydro generation reflects the shadow price of stored water and is shown by the
top curve in Figure 5; the bottom curve shows the level of gas generation. The average annual
level of hydro generation is 24.45 TWh, which accounts for 60 percent of total generation. This
is not far distant from the 56 percent of hydro generation in NZEM in 2007. While more hydro is
used when the shadow price of water is low, the fluctuation in annual hydro generation (standard
deviation 3.47 TWh/y) is much lower than fluctuations in the inflows (standard deviation 6.13
TWh/y) reflecting the intertemporal substitution of hydro fuel (water) between periods. Hydro
generation is most connected to inflows when storage is very high—see the high spikes in hydro
generation in the 15th, 23rd, and 24th years—or very low as revealed at times during the first
ten years of the simulation. Following a sustained period of high inflows and associated increases
22The marginal cost of gas will also be measured imperfectly where the value of stored gas departs from the spot
price of gas, as explained by Evans and Guthrie (2009). In this case measuring the marginal cost of generation
separately from the electricity spot price is problematic.
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Figure 4: Shadow price of stored water (ht) under competition
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Figure 5: Hydro (zt) and gas (mt) generation under competition
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in storage, hydro generation reaches its maximum capacity for two weeks in the middle of the
23rd year. This is the only period in the 30 years where spilling occurs.
Because gas generation transmission costs are lower than the transmission costs of hydro,
and the marginal cost of gas equals zero for very small levels of output, gas generation always
runs. Over the 30 years, gas generation accounts for 40 percent of total generation at an average
of 16.28 TWh/y, and with a smaller volatility (standard deviation 1.80 TWh/y) than hydro. As
implied by (2) and (3), gas and hydro generation are at the margin perfect substitutes where
there is an interior solution, and because marginal cost is linear and gas generation capacity is
not reached in the 30 years, the correlation coefficient between gas and hydro generation is −1.
However, because gas marginal cost is increasing and the shadow price of water varies, so does
total production and gas relative to hydro generation.
The price to consumers in each trading period is given by pt = 185− 3.47(k1zt + k2mt) and
it is depicted for the 30-year period in Figure 6. Under competition the average market price
is $48.30/MWh. Its standard deviation of $5.25/MWh produces a coefficient of variation of
CV Cp = 0.11 which represents much lower volatility relative to inflows (CV
C
y = 0.25) and hydro
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Figure 6: Market price (pt) under competition
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(CV Cz = 0.14) but the same as that of gas generation (CV
C
m = 0.11). Management of storage
reduces the volatility of hydro from that of inflows, and the operation of gas generation mitigates
the volatility of hydro. The large price falls during the 15th, 23rd, and 24th years coincide with
the low shadow price of water that itself coincided with high storage and high inflows.
As mentioned, we include simulated outcomes for monopoly management of the electricity
market in order to illustrate the effects of alternative objectives on outcomes, particularly with
respect to climate change: monopoly being a different plausible setting for an electricity mar-
ket.23 The monopolist manager of the electricity market would generate by means of the process
described in Section 2.2 with the exception of (2) and (3), which would take the alternative form
of marginal revenue equal to the marginal costs of gas and hydro generation. We report only the
summary statistics of the monopoly case and do this in the top panel of Table 1 in conjunction
with those of the competitive market.
The lower aggregate generation by the monopolist and the consequent higher market price
is standard for most monopoly settings. The quantum of these effects will depend upon the
calibration. What is most striking about the effect of monopoly management is the much reduced
use of gas generation and reduction in volatility of generation and price. Gas generation carries
a variable cost that hydro does not and the monopolist, in cutting back on aggregate generation
to raise revenue reduces gas generation but not hydro generation. In doing so it is less costly
for the monopolist, than the social planner, to manage fluctuations in inflows relatively more
by variations in gas generation than hydro generation. This is confirmed by the coefficient of
variation of storage, hydro and gas generation under competition (CV Cs = 0.90, CV
C
z = 0.14,
CV Cm = 0.11) relative to that of monopoly (CV
M
s = 0.73, CV
M
z = 0.09, CV
M
m = 0.57). The
lesser generation by the monopolist is reflected in the lower marginal cost of gas and stored water.
The generally internal solutions to (2) and (3), and the monopolist’s equivalent of these, yield
marginal costs of stored water and gas, adjusted for transmission, that are very similar. The
difference in the shadow price of stored water between the social planner and monopoly arises
in part because of their different objective functions. For the social planner (monopolist), ht is
the increment in the expected present value of welfare (profit) from a unit of stored water and
23The NZEM has four moderately large generators and one smaller one. A monopoly outcome could in theory
be obtained by collusive strategies, but the New Zealand competition authority has determined on the basis of
a 3-year study by Wolak that there was no affiliated action concerns in this market (New Zealand Commerce
Commission, 2009, p. 6).
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Table 1: Market outcomes: competition and monopoly compared
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Capacity=4.44
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.54 24.54 6.13 6.13
Storage (st) TWh 1.42 2.04 1.28 1.49
Price (pt) $/MWh 48.30 96.36 5.35 2.19
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.45 24.04 3.47 2.18
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 16.28 2.60 1.80 1.48
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 46.06 7.34 4.61 3.89
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 47.53 7.60 5.27 4.31
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4200 3580 152 76
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1503 2447 80 22
Capacity=5.44
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.54 24.54 6.13 6.13
Storage (st) TWh 1.66 2.44 1.54 1.80
Price (pt) $/MWh 48.31 96.31 4.90 2.05
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.45 24.09 3.18 2.04
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 16.28 2.57 1.65 1.38
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 46.05 7.26 4.26 3.67
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 47.54 7.51 4.83 4.04
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4201 3582 144 70
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1505 2448 61 20
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 13 52
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 39 23
will differ for any given state of the system. The actual magnitude of ht reflects the difference
in objective as well as the effect of the objectives producing lower aggregate generation under
monopoly.
The middle panel of Table 1 has the same format as the top panel, but the total storage
capacity has been increased from its calibrated value of 4.44 TWh to 5.44 TWh. The effect of
the larger reservoir is not to increase the aggregate water available for generation. Indeed, the
generation levels are negligibly affected by the extra storage.24 What the larger reservoir does do
is enable some different scheduling of gas and hydro generation with the effect that the average
amount stored and its standard deviation increase, whereas generation and price volatility fall.
This change in volatility is endogenous in that it is the result of the social planner and the
monopolist optimally responding to the larger reservoir: it differentially affects consumer and
producer surplus and affects overall welfare.25,26
The two rows in the bottom panel of Table 1 report the value to the social planner and the
electricity generation industry, respectively, of one additional TWh of storage capacity (that
is, approximately 23% of current capacity). The entries in the first of these two rows are
W (0, µ|s¯ = 5.44) −W (0, µ|s¯ = 4.44), being the increment in the expected present value of the
total surplus produced by the electricity market when the lake is initially empty and the inflow
is at its long-run level, and when total storage capacity is increased to 5.44 TWh from 4.44
24The simulation result that negligible spilling occurs during the 30 years suggests maximum storage is not a
limitation on aggregate water availability for the calibrated model.
25Given the linear inverse demand function p(q) = a − cq, consumer and producer surplus are CS(z,m) =
0.5c(k1z + k2m)
2 and PS(z,m) = a(k1z + k2m)− c(k1z + k2m)2 − bm2. Since they are respectively convex and
concave, the magnitude of expected consumer and producer surpluses may well move in different directions with
changes in the volatility of generation.
26The calculations assume that price volatility has no direct effect on the surplus flows. However, if this volatility
affected decisions outside the model—such as transmission and generation related investments—the comparison
of total surplus as shown in Table 1 would be mis-measured.
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TWh. The second of these rows depicts the change in the expected present value of generator
profits (producer surplus) arising from the same change in reservoir capacity. The only difference
between the two columns in this section of the table is that in the first one the social planner’s
optimal generation policy is followed whereas in the second one the monopolist’s optimal policy
is followed. They reveal that under competition a larger reservoir produces a significant increase
in expected producer surplus but at the expense of consumer surplus: the net effect being a
relatively small increase in total welfare. For monopoly, both consumer and producer surplus
increase.
3 Effect of climate-relevant variables
The key climatic variables we investigate are the determinants of the distribution of river flows
(and hence reservoir inflows). We also consider prices for gas that would reflect carbon taxes.
3.1 Inflows
Climate change over time may affect various aspects of inflows. We consider the effect of 30
percent changes in each of the long-run mean (µ), the volatility (σ), and the rate of mean
reversion (η), in each case keeping the other parameters at their calibrated levels. Because the
effects of these changes can generally be inferred from two points, we limit consideration to a
30 percent reduction in the unconditional mean, a 30 percent increase in volatility, and a 30
percent decrease in the rate of mean reversion.
The effects of the reduction in mean inflows on market outcomes are indicated in Table 2.
Comparison with Table 1 shows that the reduction in inflows decreases total generation, induces
substitution of gas for hydro generation, reduces welfare, and substantially reduces the value of
additional storage capacity. These results are unsurprising, for the reduction in average inflows
lowers the volume of generation fuel over the period. The proportionate increased use of gas by
the monopolist is more than that of the competitive market, which is a consequence of its much
lower use of gas under the standard calibration. The price does not increase under monopoly
proportionately to that of competition and this is reflected in monopoly’s proportionately lower
reduction in welfare from the reduced inflows. The shadow price of stored fuel rises on average
for both the social planner and the monopolist; although they value less an increment in reservoir
storage. This result reflects the lesser role of storage induced by the reduced demand for the
option to shift hydro generation between time periods and lower likelihood of unused spilled
water. In both cases producer surplus expands at the expense of consumer surplus, although
total surplus increases.
At a higher conditional volatility of inflows it might be expected that more use is made
of the storage facility to smooth generation fuel use over time and hence maintain or increase
welfare. Since the volume of fuel available over the 30 years is not changed by an increase in
σ, the average price and welfare should not be much affected, but the volatility in these will
likely be higher as not all the extra volatility can be smoothed by water storage. Of course,
the use of additional gas generation to smooth out the result from fluctuating inflows will raise
costs. This is confirmed by comparison of Table 3, which shows the effects of increased inflow
volatility, with Table 1. In the case of competition, increased inflow volatility produces a very
small substitution of gas for hydro generation, higher storage, and increases the volatility of
all market outcomes on a proportionate basis (except storage itself) by at least the increase in
water inflow volatility. Average price is virtually unaffected but prices are much more volatile,
and the value of additional storage capacity is significantly greater than in the benchmark
case. Since volatility of prices does not directly affect the welfare measure, welfare exhibits a
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Table 2: Market outcomes at 30% lower average inflows (µ|σ, η)
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 17.15 17.15 5.17 5.17
Storage (st) TWh 1.17 1.56 1.18 1.33
Price (pt) $/MWh 59.68 103.41 4.32 2.46
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 17.08 17.02 2.80 2.45
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 20.11 7.36 1.46 1.66
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 56.87 20.79 3.72 4.35
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 58.72 21.48 4.25 4.85
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 3822 3307 158 107
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1556 2347 22 50
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 4 9
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 17 16
Table 3: Market outcomes at 30% higher inflow volatility (σ|η, µ)
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.48 24.48 8.06 8.06
Storage (st) TWh 1.52 2.15 1.37 1.54
Price (pt) $/MWh 48.40 96.79 7.84 2.80
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.39 23.61 5.08 2.79
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 16.31 2.89 2.64 1.89
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 46.17 8.15 6.62 4.97
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 47.63 8.44 7.71 5.51
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4187 3563 204 101
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1489 2441 168 33
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 33 92
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 75 38
small decline that reflects the greater difficulty in substituting generation between time periods
relative to the base case. The higher volatility raises the value of an increment to the reservoir
because the ability to shift water between time periods, including avoiding spillage situations,
is of more utility when inflows are more volatile. The implications of an increase in σ for
the monopoly market are very similar, with the exception of the volatility of outcomes. The
higher conditional—and hence unconditional—volatility has exacerbated the difference between
competition and monopoly in the volatility of input use and outcomes.
A lower inflow mean-reversion parameter, η, reduces the predictability of the inflows and
thus detracts from generators’ abilities to forecast particular future benefits of stored water.
Concomitantly, it will raise the unconditional volatility of inflows. It is the first of these effects
which is important for behavior in the electricity market since period-by-period generation de-
cisions will have more uncertainty about the state of fuel supplies in subsequent periods: that
is, the future benefit of fuel. Comparing Table 4, which shows the effects on market outcomes of
slower mean reversion in inflows, with Table 1 reveals that the reduced predictability resulting
from less rapid mean reversion yields a small increase in average storage, reduced average total
surplus and a greater value from additional storage capacity. The changes in the average figures
for the competitive market are largely mirrored in monopoly; the relative increase of volatility
under competition that occurred with the increase in σ is not present. The reduced forecastabil-
ity of inflows reduces the utility of inflows per se relative to that of stored water or gas. It results
in a small increase in the marginal cost of both fuels—stored water and gas—in equilibrium and
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Table 4: Market outcomes at 30% slower inflow-mean reversion (η|σ, µ)
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.45 24.45 7.31 7.31
Storage (st) TWh 1.49 2.10 1.42 1.62
Price (pt) $/MWh 48.46 96.85 7.63 2.91
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.35 23.56 4.95 2.90
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 16.33 2.93 2.57 1.96
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 46.17 8.24 6.57 5.16
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 47.68 8.55 7.51 5.73
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4186 3561 209 104
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1491 2440 135 34
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 29 82
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 68 36
a small diminution in welfare. The increase in the marginal costs of the monopolist are greater
than for the competitive market; and yield a slightly higher reduction in welfare. Both the
social planner and monopolist value an additional 1 TWh of reservoir more highly with the 30%
reduction in η, but the social planner’s valuation increases more than that of the monopolist
in proportionate terms. The additional storage capacity would enable more storage and better
predictability to offset the reduction in mean reversion.
Since the unconditional standard deviation is σ
√
µ/2η. the decrease in η will increase the
unconditional variance and the effect of this is indicated in the comparison of the inflow standard
deviation of Tables 1 and 4.27 The form of the unconditional standard deviation implies that
the effect of an increase in the speed of reversion to the mean, will be similar qualitatively to
an increase in σ, and this is confirmed by comparison of Tables 3 and 4.
3.2 A carbon tax
In this section we consider the application of a carbon tax that has the effect of raising the
marginal cost of gas fired plant. New Zealand has not implemented a carbon tax to this point in
time, having instead put in place statutes that provide for an emissions trading scheme (ETS)28
that progressively includes industries, with electricity being among the first. A key feature of
an ETS scheme will be the volatility of the price of carbon. We anticipate that it, and the
requirement to hold or purchase carbon credits to cover emissions, may produce an input to the
electricity sector with the same effects “in-principle” as available water inflows which is beyond
the scope of our present model.29
We assume that the marginal cost of gas generators is the cost of the gas, and increase it
by 24.5 percent being the amount of the tax produced by a carbon tax of $25/tCO2 produces
the market outcomes described in Table 5.30 The results for a tax of $50/tCO2 are reported in
Appendix A.
The carbon tax raises the marginal cost of gas-fired generation and induces a reduction in it,
but little change to hydro generation. The change in the marginal cost of stored water follows
27It is the unconditional variance that is being estimated for Table 4 using the 30 years of daily data.
28See http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/index.html; accessed 16 April 2010.
29Our consideration of a carbon tax might be construed as an ETS scheme with no uncertainty and a perfectly
elastic supply of carbon permits (credits) at an ad valorem fixed price.
30ACIL Consulting (2001, Table 7) reports that an emissions tax of $10 per tonne CO2 (t/CO2) would
induce a cost per Gigajoule (GJ) of gas of $0.52/GJ. At the 2007 gas price of $5.34/GJ (reported at
www.crownminerals.govt.nz>Home>News>2009, accessed 29 April 2010) this tax produces an increase in gas
price of 9.7 per cent. We adjust this figure for tax rates of $25 and $50 t/CO2.
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Table 5: Market outcomes with a $25/tCO2 carbon tax
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.54 24.54 6.13 6.13
Storage (st) TWh 1.42 2.04 1.28 1.49
Price (pt) $/MWh 53.98 96.98 5.98 2.54
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.45 24.04 3.47 2.18
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 14.61 2.42 1.62 1.37
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 51.48 8.52 5.15 4.51
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 53.12 8.81 5.89 4.99
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4114 3561 170 87
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1635 2444 82 25
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 15 59
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 44 26
the increase in the marginal cost of gas, as theory would predict for an interior solution to our
model. In comparison to the unadjusted calibrated model, the reduction in gas use lowers the
equilibrium measured increase in the marginal cost of gas from the nominal 24.5 percent to 11.12
percent. It also produces an increase in consumer prices of 11.12 percent, thereby quantifying
the sharing of the tax burden between consumers and generators. The more volatile shadow
prices of water, gas, and final electricity price suggest that the demand for hydro as a substitute
for gas generation is relatively more important than its application to optimising, or smoothing,
water use over time. The average and volatility of hydro and generation remain unchanged, but
gas generation falls (see Table 5). The welfare effect of the tax is to reduce the total surplus
under competition relatively more than under monopoly, reflecting the base case lower use of
gas fired generation. The increased volatility of final price resulting from the tax is significant
under both market structures, but is not an element of welfare, although the volatility of it too
increases with the carbon tax. The value of an additional TWh of capacity under competition
and monopoly is not much different from that of the base case. Under competition producers’
surplus is higher under the carbon tax than without It might reflect that fact that the non-taxed
hydro generators benefit from the carbon tax since the tax raises consumer prices.
4 Conclusion
We develop a tractable operational model of an electricity market that properly accounts for
key characteristics of such markets, including stochastic fuel-availability and the possibility of
managing the associated volatility by means of storage. The model is calibrated to the New
Zealand electricity market and the market outcomes show that the management of storage
materially affects these outcomes. The link between intertemporal allocation of generation and
the mix of generation at any point in time is determined by the forward-looking shadow price of
water. The price and quantity outcomes are volatile but much less volatile than is fuel availability
and less volatility under monopoly than competition. The competitive market produces higher
welfare in each trading period than the monopolist, with the monopolist economising relatively
more than the competitive market on the use of gas. The monopolist runs the market less hard
and thereby produces a less volatile sequence of market outcomes for the same reservoirs.
The model suggests that if climate change reduces long-run hydro fuel availability it will
reduce welfare significantly; if it increases the volatility of fuel availability then it will also
reduce welfare, but to a relatively small extent. Reduced predictability of inflows has a similar
effect to that of increased variation in them. We show that an expansion in the reservoir would
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be of benefit where inflows become more volatile, but of negligible benefit when average inflows
fall. In general there may be a conflict between consumers and generators in that in a number
of circumstances reservoir expansion (holding inflow characteristics constant) reduces consumer
surplus, raises producer surplus, and raises total surplus. This conflict is especially evident
under competition, when price volatility is relatively high.
Our approach can be developed in a number of ways, although it will have tractability
limitations as it requires a low number of state variables. An important development would be
to make demand stochastic. This additional source of volatility and uncertainty is characteristic
of electricity markets and would likely affect the management of storage and the value attached
to storage facilities. Incorporating the features of an emissions trading scheme would also be
fruitful. These are also likely to require incorporation of storage of a quantum (emission credits)
with volatile prices. The market structure of monopoly is a polar case and work is proceeding
on alternative oligopoly structures.
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A Additional results
Table 6: Market outcomes with a $50/tCO2 carbon tax
Quantity Units Mean Standard deviation
Comp. Monop. Comp. Monop.
Inflow (yt) TWh/y 24.54 24.54 6.13 6.13
Storage (st) TWh 1.42 2.04 1.28 1.49
Price (pt) $/MWh 58.61 97.51 6.50 2.84
Hydro gen. (zt) TWh/y 24.45 24.04 3.47 2.18
Gas gen. (mt) TWh/y 13.26 2.27 1.47 1.28
MC of hydro (ht) $/MWh 55.89 9.53 5.59 5.05
MC of gas (c′(mt)) $/MWh 57.67 9.86 6.39 5.59
Welfare flow (TSt − c(mt)) million $/y 4043 3546 184 97
Profit flow (PSt − c(mt)) million $/y 1736 2441 84 28
Social value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 16 66
Market value of 1TWh of capacity million $ 49 29
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